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it is a long-standing and general rule that ideas are
"free as the air" as Justice Brandeis eloquently stated in the
dissent to the seminal case International News Service v.
Associated Press.' This axiom of copyright law expresses the
idea that copyright does not protect ideas but only protects
the expression of ideas in a work. The distinction between
unprotected ideas and protected expression is often referred
to as the idea-expression dichotomy.
The principle of the idea-expression dichotomy was
initially stated in Baker v. Selden,2 and later cases further
articulated this principle, so that it has become one of the
central tenets of copyright. This well-established rule was
adopted in section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act, which
provides that"In no case does copyright protection ... extend
to any idea .. .,4 Ideas in the strictest sense thus live in the
shadow of copyright law, which persistently refuses to award
any exclusive right to anything but an original expression of
ideas.
This absence of protection can be problematic in
light of the fact that some ideas, though undeveloped, possess
value independent from their future expression. Consider
an "idea man" ' attending a "pitch meeting" with a movie
studio executive, during which he discloses, either orally or
through a succinct writing, a brilliant but barely developed
sketch of a story line and some basic characters. The
executive, after listening to the idea man disclose his idea
for a new movie, says that he is not interested in the idea,
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but later hires a writer to draft a screenplay based upon the
disclosed idea. While the screenwriter, or more probably
the studio that ordered the screenplay as a work-made-for-
hire, will have protection under the copyright laws, the idea
man is left with no federal copyright claim. Courts have, in
light of this common situation, devised a body of rules,which
some authors christened "idea law."6 Idea law purports to
protect the interests of the idea creator, under the typical
circumstances where the idea is disclosed to a party who
uses it without compensating the creator. Contract law is
the legal ground that courts consistently recognize as being
the most workable to compensate the idea creator and
protect his literary or artistic idea.
Idea-submission contracts have been found to exist
on both an express and on an implied basis. An express
idea-submission contract typically provides for the disclosure
of the pitched ideas and the amount and conditions for
compensation. 7 It should be noted, though, that express
agreements of this kind are extremely rare, since idea
recipients are generally quite reluctant to pay for the
disclosed idea. Because idea-submission contracts are so
rarely materialized into express contracts, courts must often
find an implied-in-fact contract, ex post, when the idea man
claims that the disclosure of the idea was actually made
pursuant to a contract. Such a contract can be defined as an
agreement whose existence and terms are evidenced by
conduct, rather than by words.8
One problem with either contract-based theory is
that it only binds the parties to the contract, meaning that
the idea is not withdrawn from the public domain and anyone
else is free to use it. Another problem is that some
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jurisdictions interpret contract law as applied to ideas in a
very demanding fashion, requiring that the idea be novel and
concrete. Others, however, have remained closer to the
principle of parties' autonomy and contractual freedom, by
enforcing an express or implied agreement to pay for the
idea submitted, regardless of whether the idea is novel or
concrete.
Thus, state contract law seems adequate to protect
idea-creators where copyright law gives no protection.
However, copyright law throws a wrench in the works with
its preemption doctrine in section 301 of the 1976 Copyright
Act, which extended federal copyright protection to all works
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and eliminated state
common law copyright protection for fixed, but unpublished
works.' Section 301 was an attempt by Congress to devise
a uniform preemption approach that would produce clear
and consistent results. The
question then becomes: to
what extent does section
301 apply to the remedies
granted to an idea creator
pursuant to an idea
submission contract existing
under state law?
In an attempt to
answer this question, Part II
of this article will present the
different types of idea-
submission contracts and the legal requirements placed on
their enforcement, depending on the jurisdiction, arguing in
favor of the broadest enforcement of idea-submission
contracts. Part III will address the issue of express
preemption, analyzing the interplay between idea-submission
contracts and the requirements stated by Section 30 1. Part
IV will turn to an examination of the probability of
preemption of idea-submission contract claims under the
broader ground of implied preemption, dictated by the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause. The article will conclude
that idea-submission contract claims are not expressly
preempted pursuant to Section 301 nor are they impliedly
preempted. It follows that contracts and copyright should
not be viewed as rivals. Consequently, idea men, although
logically deprived of any remedy on the ground of copyright
infringement should nevertheless be able to obtain
compensation for their idea submitted pursuant to a contract.
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The California and NewYork Courts, under whose
jurisdictions a large part of literary and artistic idea litigation
takes place, have differing conceptions of the extent to which
contracts can indirectly protect ideas. The analysis of these
courts' requirements is necessary in order to perform a
detailed study of the preemption risk, with respect to
contract claims introduced pursuant to an idea submission.
A ' he Ca frnia Approach
(1) A Contract Recovery Theory
In Desny v. Wilder,"0 the California Supreme Court
developed standards in order to determine the validity of
an idea-submission contract. This standard has proven to be
successful, and California case law shows evidence of a
continuing application of what is sometimes referred to as
the "Wilder Test"' Wilder can be considered the first case
that truly expanded idea protection via contract law.
In the Wildercase, Desny telephonedWilder to reveal
an idea for a film. Desny spoke to Wilder's secretary, who
asked him to disclose the idea to her over the telephone.
Wilder's secretary, who apparently liked the idea, wrote a
summary of the proposed story. Desny made clear to the
secretary that he was disclosing the idea with the
understanding that he would be compensated, should Wilder
decide to use it. Wilder subsequently produced a film that
used an idea similar to the one pitched by Desny, without
compensating Desny1
2
In Desny's suit to recover damages for the use of his
idea, the court rejected the existence of an express
agreement despite the statement of the secretary that she
understood that, by using Desny's idea, Wilder would be
obligated to pay. In a very questionable manner, the court
justified its position by holding that the parties never
discussed whether novelty was a prerequisite to payment.
The court applied its four-pronged test and first found Desny's
idea valuable, which was evidenced by Wilder's production
of a film based on the idea. 3 This production also met the
fourth prong of actual use of the idea. The court then
concluded thatWilder, through his secretary, solicited Desny's
idea, when Wilder's secretary asked Desny to disclose the
idea to her over the telephone.14 Further, as Wilder's
secretary and Desny both understood that payment was
expected upon subsequent use, the court held that the third
prong of the test was satisfied.' The Wilder court thus
suggested that an offeree might enter into a contract for
ideas, regardless of their novelty or lack thereof.6
The Wilder court held that although most courts
generally accept the axiom that ideas are as free as the air,
"there can be circumstances where neither air, nor ideas,
may be acquired without cost."'' 7 The court concluded that
someone who submits a valuable idea to a producer, who
either solicited the idea or voluntarily accepts it knowing
that it was tendered for a price, is entitled to recover the
idea's reasonable value, in case of later use by the recipient. 8
The Court devised a famous four-pronged test for recovery:
(I) one must submit a valuable idea to a producer; (2) the
producer must either have solicited or voluntarily accepted
the idea disclosure; (3) the producer must know that the
idea disclosure was made in the expectation of remuneration
upon use; and (4) the producer must actually use the idea. 9
An additional requirement was added by the California Court
of Appeals in Faris v. Enberg,20 that the idea-creator must also
prove that he prepared the work, or that he was the idea-
creator who came up with the idea.
In cases decided since Desny, courts have ruled that
implied-in-fact contracts could also be found under certain
circumstances. In Chandler v. Roach,2' the court found there
was an implied-in-fact contract where the plaintiff, a
professional writer, was represented by a literary agent who
met with the defendant (a television producer) and submitted
the plaintiff's idea for a television program. During meetings,
the agent entered into an agreement with respect to the
idea. The court reasoned that"if a producer obligates himself
to pay for the disclosure of an idea, whether it is for
protectible or unprotectible material, in return for disclosure
thereof, he should be compelled to hold his promise. '22 The
Chandler court took an interesting and sound position when
it held that to require novelty or concreteness would be to
apply the law of copyright erroneously.3
The remarkable contribution of Chandler is that the
court totally suppressed the novelty standard, willingly
departing from the doctrine applicable to technical ideas,
the protection of which requires a certain amount of novelty
in patent law. Moreover, while other courts had already
considerably lowered the traditional novelty threshold in
cases involving undeveloped ideas protected by express
agreements, the Chandler court did so while acknowledging
the existence of an implied-in-fact contract. This is especially
remarkable, since requirements for the validity of an implied-
in-fact idea submission contract are traditionally more
stringent than for express contracts. 4
The suppression of the novelty requirement can also
be found in a later landmark case: Donahue v. Ziv Television-
Programs, Incorporated."5 In this case, the court reasoned
that since individuals can expressly contract for non-novel
ideas, reading a novelty requirement into an implied-in-fact
contract could not be justified. 6 The court added that the
use of an idea, subsequent to its disclosure, indicates that
the offeree sought the idea, regardless of novelty.2
The California approach to idea submission contracts
is creator-oriented. It admits that implied contracts can be
formed even if the submitted idea is not necessarily novel,
which expands protection for idea creators. In addition, the
California approach seems to be protective of idea creators,
to the extent that the Wilder test and subsequent case law
have stated broad principles encompassing a wide range of
circumstances in which an agreement can be found.
(2) Comments on the California
Approach
The most problematic issue with respect to the
California approach is the difficulty of proving the existence
of an implied-in-fact contract. The Wilder test may appear
quite generous to idea creators, but it should be kept in
mind that the test requires proof of a promise to pay for an
idea, which might very well be a claim-killing burden. Besides,
in the event that an idea creator did not obtain such promise,
the Wildertest does not allow for implying a promise to pay
for an idea simply from facts showing that the idea was
conveyed with the hope or expectation that some obligation
will ensue, even if the idea is valuable and has been used for
profit.28 Idea men are therefore left with a very difficult
element to prove in order to succeed on an implied contract
claim.
The California approach could also be criticized from
a strictly legal standpoint, for what seems to amount to
confusion between legal doctrines of contract and copyright
law. The California approach sometimes led courts to
introduce strictly copyright-related concepts in the analysis
of the implied-in-fact contract doctrine, such as the concepts
of "access" and "substantial similarity.''29 The determinations
to be made in a copyright context, where the proof of copying
is essential, should be different from determinations in idea
submission cases.
However, some could argue that the use of copyright
law concepts like access and substantial similarity may be
useful in implied-in-fact contract cases, where the formation
of the contract is difficult to prove, and these concepts can
show that an idea was disclosed and used. It should,
nevertheless, be noted that the Wilder test utilizes contract
law concepts that seem sufficient to prove the formation of
an idea-submission contract which triggers an obligation to
pay.
B. The -wY k proach
While the California protection level for ideas is quite
high, New York provides a rather minimal amount of
protection. The NewYork Courts rely on confusing, arbitrary
and inconsistent standards, and the lack of protection
afforded by the NewYork courts is worsened by the extreme
stringency of the courts' standards, which require both
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(1) New York Courts' Standards:
Concreteness and Novelty
CONCRETENESS
Property ideas are the basis for idea protection in
NewYork Thus, NewYork courts require that an idea must
be sufficiently concrete before it is considered "property,"
entitling the creator to protection. 3' New York courts
required concreteness" in addition to
the requirement that the idea be
reduced to a tangible form 3 They also
required concreteness as signifying a
tangible form.34 The courts' rationale
is that only the form of an idea
deserves protection, and not the idea
itself.3 In O'Brien v. RKO Radio
Pictures, 6 the plaintiff claimed that his
idea had been improperly used by the
defendant to create a movie. The
court held that the story was too
abstract and general to sustain a claim
of literary property, and therefore it
did not meet the concreteness
requirement.
The New York courts have
actually used two different definitions for concreteness in
the development of an idea, 37 and it is difficult to identify
what level precisely applies in any given case. The first is the
"immediate use" theory, which considers that concreteness
means that an idea "has been developed to the point where
it is ready for immediate use without embellishment."38 A
second, alternative, interpretation of the concreteness
requirement is based on the "elaborated idea" standard. 9
According to this theory, the inquiry is whether the idea-
recipient could have produced the finished work if the idea-
creator had not produced the elaborated idea. This approach
is used by only a few courts,40 and need not be analyzed in
depth here.
NOVELTY
The additional requirement developed by NewYork
courts pertains to the novelty of the idea. These courts
consider this novelty to be the idea's value, which supplies
consideration in an idea-submission contract. It seems that
the NewYork approach enforces only contracts bearing on
ideas that are original enough to be copyrightable elements.
The seminal NewYork case, Soule v. BonAmi Co.,4'
held that an idea that was not "novel" could not have any
value and was therefore not consideration to a contract. In
Soule, in consideration of the plaintiff's agreement to impart
certain valuable information that would increase the
defendant's profits, the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff
one half of any increased profits.42 The plaintiff's idea was
that if the defendant would increase the selling prices of its
product, its profits would be increased.43 The defendant did
increase the selling price of his products shortly after the
plaintiff gave him the idea.44 The court held that the contract
was lacking consideration since the alleged information was
neither new nor original and could not be deemed to be
valuable, being merely a matter of common knowledge.
4
Numerous cases have made the enforceability of the
idea-submission contract contingent upon the existence of
a proprietary interest in the idea on the part of the plaintiff.46
A novelty requirement follows this by rendering the idea a
property of the idea creator and allowing the idea to become
a valid consideration.
(2) Critique of the NewYork Approach
CRITIQUE OF THE CONCRETENESS
REQUIREMENT
The concreteness standard is, at best, inherently
vague and most certainly a misplaced requirement. Very few
cases have devised a practical definition of the notion of
concreteness.4 7 Courts seem to waver between concreteness
as a level of conceptual development and concreteness as
the state of an idea once expressed, thereby wrongly using a
copyright law concept.' It has been stated that "the critical
elements of concreteness are matters dependant largely upon
the eye of the Court' 49 which fosters legal uncertainty.
However, Professor Nimmer rightly comments that
"if we think of an idea as conception, ... a preliminary plan,
then, surely, to speak of an idea developed to the point where
it is ready for use, presents a contradiction in terms, since, if
an idea is so developed, it ceases to be merely an idea." '
NewYork's concreteness requirement is therefore a fallacy:
such a concreteness requirement implies a very high level of
detail and development. It follows that a "concrete" idea,
understood in the sense defined by several NewYork courts,
would probably be copyrightable in and of itself, since a high
level of development often entails the presence of originality
and expression in a tangible medium, the basic requirements
for copyright protection.' This conception might have a
tremendous influence on Federal preemption analysis, since
a conflict between copyright and contract law might arise
from the requirement that submitted ideas be elaborated
for a contract claim to be valid.
CRITIQUE OF THE NOVELTY
REQUIREMENT
The New York novelty requirement is similarly
inappropriate, in that it uses the fiction of the property
interest in an idea as an erroneous legal ground thus rendering
any court denying contractual protection to an undeveloped
idea less prone to criticism. Additionally, the burden of
proving novelty can be claim killing.2 Peter Swarth rightly
points out that the NewYork approach creates a lower status
for (artistic) idea vendors, as opposed to purveyors of any
other type of product, noting that"[n]ovelty is not an implied
requirement in a contract for any other type of service or
product. 3
In addition, requiring that ideas should be considered
property in order to constitute sufficient consideration is
rather offensive to the canons of copyright law. We have
restated that ideas are by essence "free as the air to common
use. "' It seems impossible to justify a requirement that an
idea constitute property when an undeveloped idea
inherently is not protected by copyright, which protects
literary and artistic property. While it might be argued that
an idea-submission contract may only be validly formed to
the extent that the idea-creator conveys a valuable "property"
in consideration for the others' payment, the Nimmer treatise
proposes that the consideration is the service of disclosure
of the idea, rather than the idea itself;55 and that, therefore,
the idea itself need not have any particular characteristics.
Perhaps, however, the greatest problem with a novelty
requirement is that the characteristics of a novel idea closely
resemble those of copyrightable material, thus rendering the
contract claim prone to federal preemption.
It is worthwhile to note that, despite its problems,
the novelty requirement might have a practical, procedural
function that may counterbalance the fact that it is otherwise
questionable. Professor Sobel considers that requiring
novelty is useful to prove that the idea used by the defendant
was actually the idea submitted by the plaintiff.5 6 This
requirement is an important function, because if the defendant
independently conceived the idea it used, or obtained it from
another source, the defendant should not be held liable.5 7
Idea-submission contracts, as protected by state laws,
should not fall within the express prohibitions of the
CopyrightAct. Section 30 1 of the CopyrightAct states three
requirements for a state right to be preempted: (I) the right
must bear on a fixed work of authorship, (2) within the subjec
matter of copyright, and (3)the right must be equivalent to
any exclusive right within the scope of copyright.5 8 The
fixation, subject matter, and equivalence requirements will
successively be examined, and we will prove that none applies
to idea-submission contract claims, and therefore the federal
copyright act does not preempt state law protection for
ideas.
Section 301 states as a condition to preemption that
the state right must pertain to "works of authorship that
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression." This condition
is based on the limit built into the
Copyright Act that federal copyright
protection does not extend to
works that have not been fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. By
its own terms, therefore, section 301
does not bar states from protecting
unfixed works. The House Report
on the 1976 Copyright Act lists
examples of unfixed works:
"Choreography that has never been
filmed or notated, extemporaneous speech, original works
of authorship communicated solely through conversations
or live broadcasts, and a dramatic sketch or musical
composition improvised or developed from memory and
without being recorded or written down." 9
Preemption is thus expressly excluded when an idea
is merely disclosed orally to a recipient because it is not
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. However, this case
for excluding idea-contracts from preemption may not be a
complete argument against preemption, since most disclosed
ideas are either revealed in writing, or, if submitted orally,
subsequently reduced to writing by the recipient, to keep a
trace and a record of the idea. This argument against
preemption could therefore be insignificant.
However, section 301 requires fixation not of all
material, but only of a "work of authorship." By definition,
ideas are not developed enough to be works of authorship.
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Thus, even if fixed for the convenience of their
communication, ideas do not come under the scope of the
"fixation" requirement because they are not works of
authorship.
Section 301 provides that"rights ... that ... come within
the subject matter of copyright, as specified by Sections 102
and 103 are to be preempted: "'6 Section 102, defines which
works are granted copyright protection, saying that copyright
protection is afforded to:
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression ... includ[ing] the following
categories: literary works; musical works...;
dramatic works ... ; pantomimes and choreographic
works; pictorial, graphic and sculptural works;
motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
sound recordings; and architectural works.
6'
Section 102(b) also explicitly excludes copyright protection
of "any idea." Section 103 extends protection to compilations
and derivative works. However, these two sections do not
sufficiently define the "subject matter of copyright:' nor does
any other section of the Copyright Act. This lack of any
proper definition of the subject matter to be addressed by
the Copyright Act is problematic.
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As far as ideas are concerned, a very difficult legal
question arises: does Section 102(b) signify that ideas are
not within the subject matter of copyright, because it
expressly excludes them from copyright protection, or can
they nevertheless be considered as being in the subject
matter of copyright, precisely because they are the subject
of an express provision (albeit one that gives them no
protection)? The only reasonable interpretation, supported
by a strict construction of the terms of the CopyrightAct, as
well as case law, is that ideas cannot be deemed to be included
in the subject matter of copyright.
(1) Arguments in Favor of the Inclusion
of Ideas in the Subject Matter of
Copyright
Two arguments can be made in favor of the inclusion
of ideas in the subject matter of copyright. First, legislative
history and textual analysis could give reason for a certain
reading of the Copyright Act to justify the inclusion. Second,
courts addressing this question, relying on either erroneous
grounds or on facts that can be distinguished from a true
idea-submission contract, have recently held that ideas were
included in the subject matter of copyright.
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An analysis of legislative history and of the text of
the Copyright Act can be read to support the inclusion of
ideas in the subject matter of copyright. Section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act explicitly denies copyright protection to
ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation,
concepts, principles, or discoveries. According to Professor
Goldstein,64 the Copyright Act can be read to embody a
Congressional intent to include the elements listed in Section
102(b) as part of the subject matter of copyright.6" The key
to this analysis lies in the use, in Section 102(a), of the phrase
"Work of Authorship" to define what does get protection.
In Section 102(b), the phrase "works of authorship" is also
used. This drafting could suggest that ideas are "original works
of authorship," and are, therefore, included in the subject
matter of copyright, but excluded from protection. The legal
implication of this interpretation is to increase the probability
that ideas are removed from the scope of possible state
regulation because they fulfill the subject matter conditions
of federal copyright preemption. However, several arguments
will be raised to refute this position.66
There are also several cases which have held that
ideas are within the subject matter of copyright. In Berge v.
Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama,67 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether an idea-
submission claim could be deemed to be within the subject
matter of copyright.68 The Berge court ultimately held that
"ideas embodied in a work covered by the Copyright Act
fall within the subject matter of the Act, because ... scope
and protection are not synonymous." 69 Moreover, the court
stated that: "the shadow actually cast by the Act's preemption
is notably broader than the wing of its protection"7% The
Berge decision was later followed by the Ninth Circuit in
Metrano v. Fox Broadcasting, which similarly held that the idea-
submission claim was preempted because ideas are in the
scope of copyright, even though they are granted no
protection by it.
7'
It should also be noted that the jurisprudential trend
leans towards holding that ideas fixed in a tangible medium
of expression are within the subject matter of copyright, for
the purposes of preemption. In Selby v. New Line Cinema
Corporation,' a California Federal District Court found that
ideas for a movie were within the subject matter of copyright
for preemption purposes.73 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed a case from theWestern District of Michigan, Wrench
LLC v. Taco Bell Corporation, in which the court held that
plaintiff's breach of contract claim pertaining to an idea for a
Chihuahua in a televised advertisement fell within the subject
matter of copyright for preemption purposes.74 Another
case7 held that "even though the ideas embodied in a work
covered by the Copyright Act fall outside copyright
protection, this does not mean that they fall outside the
Act's scope, regarding its subject matter... .76 These cases
show that courts have been creating a distinction between
copyright protection, from which ideas are excluded, and
the subject matter of copyright, in which ideas would be
included.
However, the reasoning in cases supporting the
inclusion of ideas in the subject matter of copyright takes
into consideration the degree of detail of the ideas submitted.
Some ideas are so detailed that they constitute an actual
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work of authorship. In Endemol Entertainment B.V v.
Twentieth Television, Incorporated, the facts concerned a
contract providing compensation for use of the ideas
contained in a new television format.77 Even though
commentators include Endemol in "idea cases,"78 close
examination reveals that it is not really an idea case. The
opinion mentions that the Defendant developed a show based
on the "format, expression and concepts of" the plaintiff's
program.79 It can be inferred that the format submitted was
"expressed," within the meaning of Section 102 (a) of the
Copyright Act. Also, the television program is said to have
been "new." Although novelty and originality are entirely
different concepts belonging to the completely different legal
spheres of patent and copyright, the fact that the program
was new could induce the existence of at least the minimal
degree of creativity required by Feist,80 in order to find
originality. Thus, the format in contention could probably be
considered an original work of authorship expressed in a
tangible medium of expression, not simply an idea. Moreover,
the fact that the Endemol court found that the "expression"'"
had been copied is evidence that the issue at stake was more
than a mere idea, and that the inclusion of the copied material
in the subject matter of the CopyrightAct was justified.
A similar argument can be made about Selby 2 in which
the plaintiff had written a screenplay and submitted it to the
defendant .8  The codefendant copied the "ideas and
expression" of the plaintiff's work." The copied work was
an actual screenplay, i.e., a copyrightable property, and was
copied in its expression. It implies that the submitted
screenplay was within the subject matter of copyright, not
just an idea. These cases should therefore be limited to their
own facts and not extended to contract claims deriving from
the submission of actual literary or artistic ideas.
More recently, in Chesler/Perlmutter Products,
Incorporated v. Fireworks Entertainment, Incorporated," a
production company that allegedly created an idea for a
television program brought an action against a competitor
that produced an allegedly similar show, claiming breach of
express and implied contract and unjust enrichment. The
court held that since the concept at issue had been converted
to a written treatment it was in "copyrightable form," and
therefore included in the subject matter of copyright.86
(2) Support for the Exclusion of Ideas
from the bect Matter of Copyright
HOUSE REPORT
Thus, although many cases have held ideas to be in
the subject matter of copyright, upon closer inspection of
the facts, the "ideas" in these cases were developed enough
to be original works of authorship which would clearly be
within the subject matter of copyright, not mere "ideas."
Professor Goldstein87 cites to the House Committee
Report to the 1976 Copyright Act, which emphasizes that
"Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope
of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose
is to restate, in the context of the new single federal system
of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression
and ideas, remains unchanged:'88 Since ideas have been the
subject of a long admitted exclusionary treatment, depriving
them from any protection by copyright, 9 the status quo
announced in the House Report means that Section 102(b)
does not modify the exclusionary treatment of ideas.
Advocating against preemption, it should be noted
that there is a logical, if not obviously statutory, nexus
between an absence of protection and an exclusion from
the subject matter of copyright. The subject matter of
copyright characterizes the elements to which copyright
applies. When copyright applies to a given element, it is
protected by copyright. The assertion that an element which
is not protected by copyright is included in the subject matter
of copyright is completely illogical.
Some might argue that the House Report is not
helpful in determining whether ideas are within the subject
matter of copyright, because it merely calls for speculation
as to the nexus between absence of protection by copyright
and exclusion from its subject matter, based upon the fact
that the House Report only states that the idea-expression
dichotomy is unchanged, which does not signify that non-
protection amounts to non-inclusion in the subject matter
of copyright. However, a strict interpretation of the
CopyrightAct itself sheds light on the unclear subject matter
requirement, in such a clear and unequivocal way that the
exclusion of ideas from the subject matter of copyright should
be difficult to challenge.
STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE
COPYRIGHT ACT
The provision of Section 301 pertaining to subject
matter is entitled, aptly enough, "Subject matter of
copyright."9 ° Section 102(b) expressly provides that copyright
protection cannot be awarded to an idea, that is, there is no
copyright in an idea. There is no doubt that copyright
protection and "copyright," as used in Section 301, refer to
the same concept. It can thus be argued that section 102(a)
simply provides a positive definition of the subject matter of
copyright, and 102(b) states a negative definition, by listing
elements that are not in the subject matter. Therefore,
under strict textual analysis, those elements specifically
excluded from copyright protection are not within the subject
matter of copyright and are therefore not preempted by the
federal copyright statute.
Moreover, if Section 102(b) denies copyright
protection to ideas that appear in federally protected works of
authorship,9' it does not necessarily follow that ideas are,
in and of themselves, works of authorship. On the contrary,
this section implicitly denies copyright protection to ideas
that appear independently from any copyrightable, tangible
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work. 2
The Endemol court clearly misinterpreted Section
301, by stating that "even though the ideas embodied in a
work covered by the Copyright Act fall outside copyright
protection,this does not mean that they fall outside theAct's
scope, regarding its subject matter.""'3 The subject matter
referred to in Section 301 is the subject matter of copyright
not of the Copyright Act.94 It is true that, had Section 301
included the terms "subject matter of the Copyright Act",
since ideas are referred to in the Copyright Act, although
given an exclusionary treatment, they could have been
preempted. But since ideas are excluded from copyright
protection, they are excluded from the subject matter of
copyright, and thus state laws protecting them are not
preempted. This interpretation is much more convincing
because it takes into
account the actual
drafting of the
statute, to which it is
indispensable to turn
in order to reach a o






matter of copyright is
to shelter idea-
submission contracts
claims from federal preemption, on the grounds that there is
no conflict between federal copyright and contracts. Federal
copyright is granted to truly copyrightable matters and applies
to all copyrightable materials through preemption, while idea
submission contracts concern mere ideas, which do not fall
within the subject matter of copyright.
C. The "-Equivalent Rights"
Requirement
Section 301(a) requires, as the third condition for
preemption,9" that the state right in question be a "legal or
equitable" right that is "equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights, within the general scope of copyright, as specified by
Section 106."96This provision is very similar to the requirement
developed by case law prior to the Copyright Act. In Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,97 and Compco Corp. v. Day Brite
Lightning, Incorporated,98 both decided prior to the 1976
Copyright Act, the Supreme Court stated a preemption
formula that precisely focused on the nature of the state
right granted. Thus, a state doctrine would only be voided99
if it offered protection similar to the one given by the federal
patent or copyright laws.' Therefore, in order to determine
whether state idea-submission contract claims are equivalent
to exclusive rights within the scope of copyright, it is first
necessary to define the notion of the general scope of
copyright before an assessment can be made of the concept
of equivalent rights.
(1) The "General Scope" Condition
NOTION OF "GENERAL SCOPE OF
COPYRIGHT"
Courts generally hold that the notion of "general
scope of copyright" concerns conduct coming within the
scope of one or more of Section 106's exclusive rights,
which include reproduction, derivative works, distribution,
performance, and display.01 The House Report on the 1976
CopyrightAct sheds light on the meaning of "general scope"
and implies that the equivalence in the preemption analysis
















among all those that may possibly exist in the scope of
copyright. According to Professor Goldstein, the general
scope of copyright means the full scope that Congress could
have described for any particular right."13 The Report more
specifically states that"... the Preemption of Rights under
State Law is complete with respect to any work coming
within the scope of the Bill, even though the scope of
exclusive rights given the work under the Bill is narrower
than the scope of Common Law rights might have been."'04
In addition, the wording of section 301 itself seems to
indicate that the exclusive rights the equivalence of which
must be analyzed, are those "within the scope of copyright"
(not of the CopyrightAct),"as specified" (not as "provided")
by Section 106. The general scope of copyright therefore
appears to be broader than the exclusive rights set forth
at Section 106 of the Copyright Act, which might imply
that contract claims could be deemed to be a form of
exclusive right within the scope of copyright.
DIRECT APPLICATION OF THE "GENERAL
SCOPE" NOTION
Professor Goldstein tried to explain the notion of
"general scope" of copyright by comparing it to exclusive
rights in the strictest sense. He considers that even if a
state exclusive right is broader than a statutory exclusive
right, such state right is preempted. He explains that, for
instance, although Section 106(4) limits the performance
right to public performances, a state law prohibiting private
performances would nevertheless come within the general
scope of the right.
Beyond a mere literal
interpretation of the CopyrightAct,
the determination of the meaning
of "general scope" requires that we
refer to"L'esprit de la loi,' 0 to use
a French legal term. Since a right to
ideas is not mentioned at all in
Section 106, and since ideas have
always been excluded from the
benefit of exclusive rights, the use
of ideas is certainly not covered by any exclusive right,
either expressly provided by Section 106, or in the general
"spirit" of the Copyright Act.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that since a typical
idea-submission contract forbids the use of an idea without
compensation, the notion of use is here analogous to the
copyright reproduction right or the right to prepare
derivative works. These rights are expressly reserved to the
copyright holder by Section 106, thus, idea rights could be
included in the general scope of copyright. 106 However, even
if the state right pursuant to the idea-submission contract
can be deemed to be within the general scope of the
representation right, a preemption claim will, nevertheless,
fail to pass muster under Section 30 1, if we agree, as argued
in the previous section, that ideas are not in the subject
matter of copyright. In addition, the next section of this
article will argue'017 that rights awarded to the idea creators
pursuant to contract claims are not equivalent to copyright-
like rights.
(2) The Assessment of the Notion of
"Equivni t Right"
THE NOTION OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The meaning of an "equivalent right" is not defined
in the Copyright Act. Commentators have considered that
Congress may have wanted to preempt state rights that are
equivalent, in their purpose, to copyright." 8 Professor
Goldstein argues, however, that this interpretation "cuts too
narrowly" because it is relatively simple for a party challenging
preemption to assert that the purpose of the state doctrine
was independent from any copyright-related purpose. 9 If,
on the other hand, one considers that the intent of Congress
was to preempt state rights, the effects of which are
equivalent to copyright, Section 301 is too broad and implies
preemption of several well-established state rights, such as
trade secrets, unfair competition, and right of publicity.'"
Since the Copyright Act lacks clarity on this subject,
it is useful, once again, to examine the House Report. The
latter appears to explain that contract rights are not
equivalent rights: "Nothing in the Bill derogates from the
right of the parties to contract with each other, and to sue
for breach of contract."'' But this formulation still does
not expressly concede that a contract claim is not equivalent
to a copyright infringement claim.
A look at the original drafting of section 301 (b)(3)
is enlightening. This section initially provided that
misappropriation, breach of contract, breach of trust, trespass,
conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive
trade practices should not be preempted." 2 Meeting the
opposition of the Justice Department, the House of
Representatives adopted a last minute amendment, deleting
the list of examples of state doctrines that were not to be
considered as equivalent to copyright.'" It is, however, a
tenuous argument to use this deletion in favor of preemption
of contract claims because there is evidence to suggest that
misappropriation, not the other contents of the list, was the
target of the Justice Department." 4 By deleting all causes of
actions specifically listed, it is suggested that Congress
transferred the rulemaking process to courts, by calling
for an ad hoc interpretation of the preemption clause, in
light of the actual potential equivalence of state doctrines.
Congress apparently did not intend to restrain the courts'
interpretative power of the Copyright Act by expressly
enumerating restrictions to the scope of Section 301.
Moreover, Professor O'Rourke commented that the
original inclusion of breach of contract as an example of a
cause of action that would survive preemption suggests that
Congress did not intend, as a general rule, to preempt breach
of contract actions, under theAct. '" The result of this analysis
is that the study of legislative history alone is not enough to
clarify the equivalence clause.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
NOTION OF EQUIVALENCE
Interpretation Centered on the Opposability of
Equivalent Rights
The term opposability refers to the possibility for
the plaintiff to assert a right against another person. Exclusive
rights derived from copyright are absolute and exist as
opposed to the world, while contractual rights only bind
Idea Men Should be Able to Enforce Their Contractual Rights
contracting parties.Thus, rights granted under the Copyright
Act cannot be equivalent to idea-submission-contract claims
because of the difference in opposability. Judge Easterbrook
addressed this issue of opposability in the Seventh Circuit
case of Pro CD v. Zeidenberg," 16 saying that:
Copyright law forbids duplication [and] public per-
formance ... unless the person wishing to copy or
perform the work obtains permission, silence
means a ban on copying. A copyright is a right
against theWorld. Contracts, by contrast, generally
affect only their parties, strangers may do as they
please, so contracts do not create "exclusive
rights.' 17
The comparison of opposability of contract rights to that of
copyright rights thus allows readers to deduce not that
contracts do not create exclusive rights at all, because they
do, to a certain extent, but rather that contract rights are
not equivalent to copyright-derived rights because of their
fundamentally reduced scope of opposability.
That being said, although this approach relies on a
literal interpretation of Section 301, it seems quite
satisfactory. It accurately contemplates the opposability of
rights, to different levels of players: copyright is universally
opposable, whereas contract rights are only opposable to
the party or the parties who entered into the agreement,
that is, in a typical idea case, the idea recipient and the idea
creator.
Interpretation Centered on the Formation of the Right:
Identification of an "Extra Element"
Some commentators consider that the opposability
approach articulated by Judge Easterbrook in Pro CD is the
corollary of the very popular interpretation that the promise
involved in a contractual relationship is, itself, an "extra
element" It is, therefore, this extra element that differentiates
the formation of a contractual right from the birth of a
copyright-derived exclusive right, regardless of whether the
defendant breaches the contract by performing an act that
Section 106 reserves exclusively to copyright owners.'"
While the extra element is undeniably very powerful and
consistently useful in cases addressing idea-submission
contract claims, this criterion is not very accurate and does
not take into account on the one hand the reality of the
relations between idea-creators and idea-recipients, and on
the other, the very provisions of Section 301.
(i) The Extra Element Analyis as an
Anti-Preemption Argument
Recent cases restated quite clearly the importance
of the extra element approach." 9 In Lennon v. Seaman, the
Court held that:
[S]ome cases stand for the broad proposition that
it is the promise inherent in contract
arrangements that saves contract claims from
preemption. Under this theory, a breach of
contract clause is not preempted ... because,
unlike claims for copyright infringement, claims
based on a contract will involve the extra element
of a promise by one party to another1 °
In Brown v. Mojo Records,"' the court found that a contract
claim has an "extra element" that makes it different from
copyright infringement. 2 The extra element consists of
proof of the alleged contractual relationship, its terms, and
the conduct that allegedly violated those terms.
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Legal scholars have also lent support to the notion
that contract claims require proof of an extra element that
should allow them to escape copyright preemption. The
Nimmer treatise, for instance, points out that:
A breach of contract action, whether such contract
involves a mere idea or a fully developed literary
work, is not predicated upon a right that is
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright... This [sic], for the
reason that a contract right may not be claimed
unless there exists an element in addition to the
mere acts of reproduction, performance,
distribution or display.The additional element is a
promise-express or implied-on the part of the
Defendant.
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Other commentators have argued that preemption
of idea-submission contract claims is systematically excluded,
because of the "ease with which a Court can find the extra
element needed for the state law to survive preemption.'
' 25
Moreover, one can argue that the extra element approach
can be something of a fallacy, since a tremendous percentage
of idea-submission contracts are either implied-in-fact
contracts 26 or express contracts that the idea-creator has
not been able to negotiate, by lack of bargaining power vis j
vis the idea-recipient. Under such circumstances, there is
practically an absence of express, bargained-for, promise, and
thus, no extra element.
In any event, these practical objections do not suffice
to question the legal validity of the extra element approach,
but show the practical limits of this argument. However,
these limits do not have very strong foundations: a recent
case proved that implied promises were not to be treated
differently from express promises. In Katz Dochterman &
Epstein, Incorporated v. Home Box Office,'27 the court held that
a claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract was not
preempted because an "implied promise to pay for its idea is
entirely separate from any claim for copyright infringement
of a literary work."' 128
The extra element approach as an anti-preemption
argument does reach a correct conclusion: a contract action
and a copyright infringement claim are qualitatively different
and fail to meet the equivalence condition required by Section
301. Also, in order to differentiate contract claims from
copyright actions, the analysis performed by courts actually
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takes into consideration the formation conditions: a contract
right arises when promises are exchanged, whereas copyright
arises by the mere act of fixation in a tangible form of
expression of an original work of authorship. This reading of
the equivalence requirement is legally correct. It adds to the
certainty that contracts claims do not award "equivalent"
rights. In Chesler/Perlmutter Products, Incorporated v. Fireworks
Entertainment, Incorporated, 29 for instance, the court took
into consideration the content of the promise. Focusing on
the fact that the promise addressed a payment schedule and
the benefits that were to be received as a result of the
payments, as well as details regarding the hiring of writer
and executive producer, the court found that "these written
terms, which go beyond a promise not to accept the benefit
of a copyright [sic] work, provide the necessary extra-
element.'"110
In conclusion, while the extra element-based
preemption argument is somewhat persuasive, the alternative
argument based on the opposability of rights seems more
straightforward and more adequate. Rights stemming from
a contract (that is only enforceable against contracting
parties) are "simply not equivalent" to rights granted under
the Copyright Act."'
(ii) The Analysis of the Defendant's Conduct
The concept of this extra element can alternatively
focus on the defendant's act that triggers the claim for breach
of contract.This focus is a diverging interpretation of the
extra element approach that consists of taking into
consideration neither the beginning of the legal continuum,
i.e., the formation of the right, nor its middle portion, i.e., its
opposability, but merely its breach, which could be considered
as the end of the said continuum. Following this approach,
some courts have developed a test examining the conduct of
the defendant who was a party to an idea-submission contract.
If the defendant's behavior consists of one or several of the
prerogatives provided by Section 106 of the CopyrightAct'3I
the contract claim is preempted. However, it is not
preempted if the defendant performed an act other than a
reserved act.'
For example, in Endemol Entertainment B. V v. Twentieth
Television Incorporated,3 4 the implied-in-fact contract
resulted from the fact that "at all times it was understood that
disclosure of the format was made in confidence, and that
the Plaintiff would be compensated for any subsequent use
of the ideas." '3 The court held that the contract at issue
created "no additional rights other than promising not to
benefit from the copyrighted work"' 36 and that the plaintiff's
claim asserted "no violation of rights separate from those
copyright law was
designed to protect and
thus the claim was
preempted."3 7
Another example
, comes from Wrench LLC
v. Taco Bell Corp.,'38 in
which the parties had a
basic understanding that if




Wrench for the fair value
of such use. The Court held that there was no per se rule
against preemption of contract claims under Section 301 "'
and decided that the "rights plaintiffs are asserting are
equivalent to rights under the Copyright Act because they
are based upon Taco Bell's reproduction or use of the
plaintiff's idea,for creation of derivative works."' 4' The court
continued its analysis by considering that "a promise not to
use another's ideas and concepts without paying for them is
equivalent to the protection provided by Section 106 of the
Copyright Act."' 42
Finally, in Selby v New Line Cinema Corp.,143 the court
considered that the alleged implied-in-fact contract did not
regulate the parties' conduct beyond mere use of the
plaintiff's ideas, and that, for this reason,the rights protected
by that contract were equivalent to the exclusive rights
protected by the Act, and preempted.'" The court added
that the parties could enter into an idea-submission contract
which could create rights that are qualitatively different from
the rights created by the Copyright Act, if they inserted a
confidentiality provision.'45
While the approach used by these cases to find
contract rights preempted is somewhat seductive, this
approach is based on incorrect premises. Endemol and Wrench
are based on the argument that a promise not to use an idea
without compensation is equivalent to a copyright-like
right.'46 The Wrench court, however, relied on the reasoning
developed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner Incorporated.4 In Del
Madera, the court found that an implied-in-law promise was
preempted, even though it was an unjust enrichment claim,
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in the realm of quasi-contracts. The precedent used by
the Wrench court was, therefore erroneous to the extent
that it did not apply to contracts, and thus Wrench should
not be given much weight.
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Some commentators nevertheless have tried to
reconcile cases clearly excluding preemption of contract
claims, like Pro CD, ' and cases tending to sustain preemption
of such claims, like Endemoland Wrench. Professor Nimmer
wrote that the latter cases are consistent with the first,
insofaras they hold that while most contract claims should
not be preempted, preemption is appropriate in certain
circumstances where the contract "merely forbids
reproduction or display.""'' s Thus, treating a contract as
providing rights equivalent to copyright rights could be
justified in circumstances where the contract actually restricts
conduct, by providing types of rights provided by section
106.
However, based on the foregoing analysis of section
30 I's three prongs, section 301 does not expressly preempt
idea-submission contract claims because a contractual right
is not equivalent to a copyright-related right, and generally
involves an idea, which is usually fixed, but not sufficiently
developed to come within the subject matter of copyright.
IV Iea Submsso Conrat
Even if we agree that section 301 of the Copyright
Act does not expressly preempt idea-submission-contract
claims, the issue still exists as to whether or not a contract
claim may be subject to implied preemption under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause. ArticleVI, clause 2 of the
Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.''
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, federal law is supreme
and will preempt inconsistent state law, if the state contractual
right is deemed to "stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."'5 2 Constitutional preemption may
be based on the complete exclusion by federal law of any
state initiative in an area covered by federal law. The
Copyright Act does not expressly forbid protection of ideas
under state law. However, "conflict preemption," in which
federal law preempts state law if a state law conflicts with a
federal law, may apply to idea-submission contracts. According
to this legal concept, even in the absence of a complete
exclusion of state protection, some Common Law claims
may conflict with superior principles at the federal level.
In order to determine whether idea submission
contract claims are totally immune from any form of
preemption, it is necessary to determine initially whether, in
spite of the absence of express preemption, idea-submission
contract claims could, nevertheless, be subject to an implied,
conflict-preemption analysis, and if so, to perform this analysis
pursuant to applicable case law.
A. Conflict between Express and
tmp ied Preemption
(1) Preemption May be Implied Even If
the State Right - not Expressly
Preempted by a Statute
As argued throughout Part III of this article, contract
claims bearing on idea-submissions are immune from
preemption under Section 301 "1 because these claims are
not equivalent to copyright rights, since they involve either
an unfixed an idea, or more often, a fixed idea that is not
sufficiently developed to raise to the level of work of
authorship whose expression contains originality."4 Idea-
submission contract claims are therefore, de facto, excluded
from the subject matter of copyright.
However, even when there is no express preemption
of a state right by federal law, the Supreme Court has
supported the argument that a state right can be subject to
implied preemption.' The Supreme Court held in Freightiner
Corp v. Myrick"5 6 that"[t]he principles underlying this Court's
preemption doctrine.., make clear that the express
preemption provision imposes no unusual, special burden
against [implied] preemption." "' In light of this, it can be
said that the presence of an express preemption provision
in the Copyright Act does not necessarily exhaust the
possibilities for implied preemption. Express and implied
preemption are, therefore, not exclusive of one another.
Moreover, protection of ideas may offend other
Constitutional provisions, like the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech, as incorporated in the fourteenth
amendment to apply to state laws, thereby justifying its
preemption." 8
(2) The Practica" Presumption of
Absense of r emption
The interplay of Section 301 and the Supremacy
Clause might create a presumption of an absence of
preemption, since the test of implied preemption mirrors
Section 301 express preemption clause. Of course, Section
301 was drafted following the confusing case law
developments of the implied preemption jurisprudence, in
order to clear up conflicting cases.' Thus, implied
preemption analysis might bring a court to a different
conclusion than it would reach under express preemption
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under section 301.
THE PARALLELISM BETWEEN SECTION
301 ANDTHE IMPLIED
PREEMPTION CRITERIA
In Goldstein v. California, '6 the Supreme Court decided
that, absent a federal command, states are free to protect
subject matter that is not protected by the Copyright Act.
Operating on the assumption,
discussed earlier in this article,
that ideas do not fall within the
protection of the Copyright
Act,16 ' Goldstein leads to the
ultimate conclusion that
protection of ideas under state
law is not impliedly preempted
by the CopyrightAct. Therefore,
the analysis of either type of
preemption, express or implied, should reach the same
conclusion: ideas are not within the subject matter of
copyright. 62 Additionally, a validation of the state right under
Section 301 indicates that an implied preemption analysis
will result in the same finding of absence of preemption.
Nevertheless, the influence of a negative finding under Section
301 is only conjecture or speculation. It remains necessary
to perform an actual legal analysis of the potential implied
preemption of idea-submission contract claims.
THE EXHAUSTIVE FORMULATION OF THE
FEDERAL OBJECTIVES
It is clear that a contract claim may be subject to
implied preemption if the contractual right is deemed to
"stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'6 3
Professor Goldstein looks to the fact that the Copyright
Act, including Section 301, represents the exclusive
formulation of federal objectives in the field."64 He then
concludes that a state protection that is not preempted
under Section 301 presumably would not be preempted'65
under implied preemption because it would not constitute
an obstacle to the execution of Congress' objectives.
Bo Implied Preempt'onAnaysis
(I)The Effect of the Nature of Ideas on
inplied Preemption
The question then becomes to what extent ideas
can be considered "unattended" by copyright, thus leaving
states free to formulate a legal protection. An answer to
this question is found in the analysis of Goldstein, the
Supreme Court case that used this concept of "unattended
area" to justify that this area can be the subject of a state
statute providing for a property right.
Under this theory, the Goldstein court decided a
case involving a state statute prohibiting unauthorized
duplication of recordings of musical performances, at a time
when federal copyright protection was not available to sound
recordings.'66 The issue at stake, though quite remote in
its nature from an idea, was, however, similar to an idea in
its legal implications, in that ideas are not now protected
and sound recordings were not protected at the time of this
case. The Court held that Congress had left unattended the
area of sound recordings, and that, therefore, state protection
of sound recordings was not preempted by the Copyright
Act. 167 Although Congress did not leave the area of ideas
unattended since it expressly provided that federal copyright
could not apply to ideas, 6' Congress in no way provided
that ideas should not be protected by states. Ideas could
therefore be considered unattended under this theory, and
idea-submission contract claims could escape preemption
because of the very nature of ideas. This argument can be
upheld as long as states do not award any copyright on
ideas.
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However, the major obstacle faced by this argument
is the position of the Supreme Court in Goldstein where the
Court implied that Congress, by refusing protection to ideas,
did not intend to leave them unattended, but rather to leave
them in the public domain. We therefore reach an impasse
under this fundamental case. The impasse can be resolved
by taking into account not only the nature of the concept of
idea, but also the entirety of the legal remedy afforded by
States, in idea-submission contracts cases.
(2) The Legal Treatme t of ldeaub- -
mission Contracts Lnder the L,-p11d
P1eempdon AnaysRs
JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Company, "I the
Supreme Court held that a state's enforcement of an express
contract to pay for a technical idea was not preempted by
federal patent law. Although the facts of this case did not
involve a literary or artistic idea, the principles of this case
can still be applied to non-technical ideas.' The court
reviewed the effect of state law on the accomplishment of
the three Congressional purposes of the federal patent
system, which, once applied to culture and arts instead of
technique, are perfectly in line with the goals of copyright. 172
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These purposes are providing incentive, encouraging
disclosure, and keeping ideas in the public domain.'73 The
court found that enforcement of the state contract law
furthered the Congressional policy of encouraging disclosure,
since the contract led to sale of products that revealed the
idea. "'74 Moreover, the court found that enforcement of
contracts to pay for ideas would provide additional incentive
to invent and would not withdraw information from the
public domain. It should be noted that the factual basis for
this conclusion was that the idea that was the subject matter
of the contract had never been in the public domain prior
to the contract to manufacture the product. 71 This
consideration does not seem to forbid application of this
case to literary and artistic ideas, which might have been in
the public domain prior to the contract. In fact, the court
emphasized that enforcement of the contract would not
prevent third parties from copying the idea: in no way could
the state doctrine be construed as awarding the creator of
the idea copyright-like monopoly rights in it.'
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Thus, enforcement of idea-submission contract
claims neither conflicts with the objectives of Congress, nor
undermines the fundamental underpinning of copyright,
according to which ideas are free as the air. On the contrary,
strong theoretical arguments can be inferred from the
Aronson case. All of them plead in favor of an absence of
preemption of idea-submission contract claims.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Professor Nimmer wrote that the arguments
developed in the Aronson case seemed to be equally applicable
to literary ideas. 77 The strongest argument supporting the
absence of implied preemption lies in the fact that idea-
submission contracts promote the general circulation of and
public access to ideas. 78 The recipient of an idea, pursuant
to an idea-submission contract, is allowed to obtain an idea
that she otherwise would not have created or for which she
would have had to expend time and money to create on her
own. The recipient thereafter often develops the idea and
publishes the product of this development. Idea-submission
contracts can thus be deemed to promote public access to
the idea. Absent a contractual protection of the idea-creator,
literary and artistic ideas would often remain undisclosed. 79
Public access to an optimal number of creations is therefore
indirectly enhanced by idea-submission contracts.
Besides, the free marketplace of ideas and the
necessity of a strong public domain' also benefit from the
contractual protection of idea-disclosers. In the event the
recipient should publish the idea without transforming it into
a copyrightable material, the public would remain free to use
the idea. In sum, far from being in conflict, idea-submission
contract claims and copyright are genuinely complementary.
This is certainly what Professor Cohen her co-authors
intended to signify, when they wrote that "it is important to
view copyright as one of many options for providing
incentives for creation and dissemination of new works " '
Contracts should be considered to be another of these
options.
Idea-submission contract claims should not be
subject to preemption. Enforcement of these claims is widely
accepted by courts. Even though some jurisdictions, such as
New York, doggedly cling to property and copyright- and
patent-like novelty and concreteness requirements, 8 '
scholars and attorneys will, hopefully, manage to convince
these courts that contractual freedom is paramount and that
the debated preliminary requirements are misplaced, if not
erroneous.
Idea-submission contract claims occupy a privileged
position in the legal arsenal available to idea-creators. Ideas
are indeed exterior to the subject matter of copyright,
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and the rights they award are simply not equivalent to those
granted by copyright. 84 Idea-submission contract claims
therefore escape express preemption dictated by Section
301 of the Copyright Act.
As far as constitutionally dictated preemption is
concerned, the implied preemption test must be conducted,
even if express preemption was not found.' Idea contract
claims also pass muster in this inquiry. In fact, relevant case
law, 86 complemented by strong theoretical arguments,
18 7
rejects implied preemption here, since idea-submission
contracts and copyright are absolutely not rivals. They can
even legitimately be considered allies in the support of idea
disclosure to the public, which plays an eminent role in the
development of creation, culture and knowledge.
Contract claims may indeed provide a remedy to
idea-men without being absorbed by federal law. Courts
should therefore systematically disregard preemption when
an actual contract for the submission of a true idea was
entered into. It will be justice to idea-men, by providing
them with an opportunity to be compensated for having
supplied one of the rarest commodities in the entertainment
industry: a good idea.
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